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Abstract
This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements
upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within
a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to
prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed neces-
sary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions.
Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explana-
tions of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However,
I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements.
Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary
for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is
not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of
process-requirements.
1. Introduction
It is commonly agreed that we are subject to different types of normative require-
ments. Arguably, rational requirements require us to be consistent and coherent;
moral requirements require us to promote general goodness; prudential require-
ments require us to promote our personal good; legal requirements require us to do
what the lawmaker prescribes of us; etc.
However, there is substantial disagreement about the philosophical nature
of normative requirements. Among the issues debated are whether normative
requirements are cognitive or non-cognitive,1 reason-giving or non-reason-giving,2
† Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Education, University of
Vienna, Ebendorferstrasse 10/13, A-1010, Vienna, Austria; Email: julian.fink@univie.ac.at
1 Suppose you assert ‘Morality requires me not to steal’. Then your assertion expresses
a cognitive normative requirement if and only if it expresses a proposition. That is, (1 your
assertion is either true or false; and hence (2) you can take a propositional attitude towards the
proposition your assertion expresses. In contrast, your assertion expresses a non-cognitive nor-
mative requirement if and only if it is not the case that your assertion expresses a proposition.
That is, (1) and (2) are both incorrect (cf. van Roojen 2009).
2 Suppose prudence requires you not to jump out of the window. This is a reason-giving
requirement if and only if you have a normative reason not to jump out of the window because
prudence requires you not to jump out of the window. Otherwise, this requirement is non-reason
giving (cf., for example, Broome 2008 and ms; Kolodny 2005; Southwood 2008).
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synchronic or diachronic,3 narrow-scope requirements or wide-scope require-
ments,4 etc.
This paper concentrates on a fundamental issue regarding the nature of
normative requirements. It explores whether normative requirements impose
process-requirements upon us. This is indeed a fundamental issue, as the existence
of process-requirements is taken to settle other disputes pertaining to the nature of
normative requirements.5
In his influential ‘Why Be Rational?’, and its sequel ‘State or Process Require-
ments?’, Niko Kolodny (2005; 2007) contends that process-requirements are
indispensable for a system of rational requirements. He defends this view on the
basis of two claims: a system of rational requirements needs to fulfil certain
functions; only process-requirements can fulfil these functions. In particular,
Kolodny argues that process-requirements are necessary in order (1) to preserve
the correctness of our ordinary, process-based explanations of why a person is
rational and irrational; and (2) to ensure that a system of rational requirements can
guide our deliberations and actions. In consequence, Kolodny concludes that
without imposing process-requirements, a system of rational requirements fails to
serve its functions.
However, this paper argues that Kolodny’s defence of process-requirements
is less than successful. Though I accept (1) and (2) to be legitimate requirement
functions, I doubt that either function necessitates the existence of process-
requirements. Even if your failure to undergo some process, say F, explains
correctly why you are irrational (or not entirely rational), I will argue that this does
not entail that rationality requires you to F. Moreover, non-process-requirements
can also guide deliberations and actions. Consequently, Kolodny fails to present a
sound argument for the existence of process-requirements.6
3 Rationality requires of you that if, ‘at time t1, you believe that you were born in
London, then, at t2, you believe that you were born in England’ expresses a diachronic require-
ment if and only if ‘t1’ precedes ‘t2’. If ‘t1’ and ‘t2’ refer to the same point of time, then this
expresses a synchronic requirement (cf., for example, Cullity 2008; Broome ms).
4 Suppose you assert that rationality requires of you that you (intend to) A if you believe
that you ought to A. This expresses a narrow-scope requirement if and only if ‘rationality
requires’ governs just the consequent of this conditional, i.e., you (intend to) A. If, instead,
‘rationality requires’ governs the entire conditional, then your assertion expresses a wide-scope
requirement (cf., for example, Broome 1999; 2007a; 2007b; Kolodny 2005; Brunero 2010;
Reisner 2009; Schroeder 2004; Fink 2010).
5 For instance, Niko Kolodny rejects the view that the requirements of rationality are
reason-giving. On his view, this follows directly from the fact that some conditional requirements
of rationality take a narrow-scope, which for him is a consequence of the fact that rationality
necessarily imposes process-requirements (cf. Kolodny 2005).
6 If my rejection of Kolodny’s defence of process-requirements succeeds, this paper also
shows that Kolodny’s argument in favour of narrow-scope requirements and his denial that
rational requirements are necessarily reason-giving is not sound.
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Nonetheless, this paper does not amount to a rejection of process-requirements
per se. Instead, I will show that process-requirements do in fact have an (alterna-
tive) essential function within a system of rational requirements. In brief, I will
argue that their existence is necessary to ascribe an accurate degree of rationality
to those who infringe a set of non-process requirements.
Unlike Kolodny, however, I shall not restrict my analysis exclusively to
requirements issued by rationality. Instead, I shall discuss the function generally
of ‘normative process-requirements’, as I will call them. I will use the notion of a
‘normative requirement’ quite loosely, and apply it to all requirements issued
by sources that are, at least seemingly, normative.7 My focus will be on investi-
gating whether process-requirements have a legitimate function within a system
of requirements that cannot be fulfilled by non-process-requirements, such as
state-requirements.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by defining process-
requirements. I will define process-requirements in terms of their content, as
asserting a positive relation between a subject and a process. In section 3 I will
investigate whether any particular ‘requirement source’ that guides our behaviour
needs to issue process-requirements. Furthermore, I will analyse whether the
correctness of our ordinary, process-based explanations of particular degrees of
a ‘normative property’8 we possess (such as morality, prudence, or rationality)
implies the existence of process-requirements. Section 4 then discusses two further
questions: Could all normative requirements be process-requirements? Does the
existence of process-requirements follow from a plausible constitutive account
of normative requirements? Section 5 turns to my own argument in favour of
the existence of normative process-requirements. I shall argue that process-
requirements are necessary for attributing the correct degree of a normative pro-
perty to those subjects who do not possess the maximum degree of that normative
property.
7 I take it that requirements issued by morality, prudence, rationality, evidence are
among those commonly perceived as normative. This is why I call them ‘normative’. Contrarily,
I suppose that requirements of chauvinism, kickboxing or whaling do not seem to fall under this
category.
8 I will assume that every normative ‘requirement source’ (such as those listed in the
previous note) comes with a corresponding normative property. Morality, for instance, clearly
imposes requirements upon you. A plausible example of a moral requirement reads as follows:
morality requires you not to show prejudice against people with a different skin colour. More-
over, morality is a graded property you possess: if, ceteris paribus, you do not show prejudice
against people with a different skin colour you will be more moral than if you do show such
a prejudice. In this paper, I shall not try to work out the exact connection between each source
and the corresponding property in this paper. Yet, I will return to their connection later in my
argument. For more on the distinction between requirement sources and corresponding pro-
perties, see Broome 2007a. For more on the connection between degrees of rationality and
requirements of rationality, see Broome 2010. Arpaly 2000 also touches upon these issues.
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2. Process-requirements defined
This paper focuses on the functions of process-requirements. But what are
process-requirements? Suppose, at time t, a normative source of requirements N
requires of a subject S that S Xs.9 Call this the ‘general-requirement schema’
(GRS). When does the GRS represent a process-requirement?
In this paper, I shall endorse a content-based definition of process-
requirements. That is, the content of a process-requirement signifies a relation
between a subject and a process. The GRS therefore represents a process-
requirement if and only if the proposition ‘S Xs’ signifies a positive relation10
between S and a process.
What is a process? What is a positive relation between a subject and a process?
Roughly, I shall associate processes with change. If a person or a thing undergoes
a process, then this thing or person is changing, and vice versa.11 Change is thus a
necessary and sufficient aspect of processes, or so I will assume. Consequently,
process-requirements require a subject to change in a certain way. As it will
become evident later, my concern in this paper is with a particular type of
process-requirement. I shall focus on requirements that demand a subject to
change with the effect of ending up in a certain attitudinal state.
Associating processes with change is, I think, relatively uncontroversial. Yet
it imposes a significant limitation: not every normative requirement whose satis-
faction necessarily needs an extended period of time is a process-requirement.
For example, to satisfy a prudential requirement to retain your attitude to intend
to eat an apple a day necessarily needs time; you have to keep having an attitude
over a certain period. Retaining an attitude is, by definition, not a way of changing.
In fact, it is a way of not changing over a period.12 So, if process-requirements
9 I will refrain from putting a time index on ‘S Xs’. I assume that the period of time at
which the requirement applies to S coincides with the period of time S can satisfy the requirement
by ensuring that that S Xs. That is, at every point of time the requirement applies to S, S satisfies
the requirement by seeing to it that S Xs. I shall thus not discuss remote requirements. By this I
mean requirements that apply to S before S can satisfy them. For a detailed account of remote
requirements, see Michael Zimmerman 1987; 2007.
10 The notion of ‘positive explanation’ will be explained below.
11 Regarding processes, I shall remain agnostic about two things. First, I shall remain
agnostic about whether change is conceptually prior to process, or vice versa. That is, I will
ignore the question of whether a person or a thing undergoes a process in virtue of changing or
whether a person or a thing changes in virtue of undergoing a process. Second, I will remain
agnostic about whether processes constitute distinct events or, in fact, series of events. Both
issues make no difference to my argument in this paper.
12 To illustrate this, suppose you are required to retain your attitude of knowing that you
were born in London. To satisfy this requirement you are not necessarily undergoing change.
Being able, at time t, to retain your attitude, say A, presupposes that, at t, you already have A. This
is not to exclude the possibility, of course, that there could be occasions at which you might need
to undergo a process in order to remain in a certain state. Suppose, for example, that in order to
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require one to change, then a requirement to retain an attitude is not a process-
requirement. Likewise, not all diachronic requirements will turn out to be process-
requirements.13
Why is this significant? Some philosophers equate process-requirements with
requirements whose satisfaction necessarily needs a period of time. They do not
seem to limit process-requirements to those requirements that a subject undergo
some change. Kolodny (2005, 517; my emphasis), for example, characterizes
process-requirements as telling us ‘how, going forward, one is to form, retain or
revise one’s attitudes’. But I think this characterization is incoherent. No doubt,
forming, retaining, and revising one’s attitudes necessarily takes time. One can
only form, retain or revise an attitude over time. But only forming and revising
one’s attitudes implies change. Retaining an attitude does not. You can retain an
attitude without altering at all.
There are two reasons why it is a mistake to equate process-requirements with
requirements whose satisfaction requires time. First, change, I take it, is a funda-
mental aspect of a process. Second, by thinking of any requirement to retain an
attitude as a process-requirement, we would undermine any meaningful distinc-
tion between state- and process-requirements. Roughly, state-requirements are
requirements whose content signifies a relation between a subject and a state.
No doubt, requirements to remain in some state are state-requirements: they are
requirements to be in a state for a certain period of time. If they were process-
requirements too, we would be forced to abandon a clear-cut distinction between
state- and process-requirements. Requirements to retain an attitude would turn out
to be simultaneously both process- and state-requirements.
Consequently, unlike Kolodny, I will not count requirements to remain in some
condition as process-requirements. Instead, this paper focuses on the function of
process-requirements whose satisfaction necessitates change, i.e., requirements to
form, revise or abandon one’s attitudes.
In defining process-requirements, I said above that the content of a process-
requirement needs to signify a positive relation between a subject and a process.
But what is a positive relation? What is the significance of this condition?
remain in the state of knowing that you were born in London, you might sometimes need to
undergo the process of entertaining the thought that you were born in Chelsea. Even so, the fact
that you remain in this state of knowing that you were born in London does not itself constitute
a process. Instead, the process consists in your entertainment of the thought that you were born
in Chelsea, which, in turn, ensures (perhaps causally) that you remain in the state of knowing that
you were born in London.
13 A requirement counts as a diachronic-requirement if and only if its content consists of
a cross-temporal relation among a subject’s attitudes or actions. Suppose, for example, at t1,
rationality requires of S that [if, at t1, S believes that p, then, at t2, S believes that q]. This will be
a diachronic requirement. But it is not necessarily a process-requirement. If, at t1, S believes q and
retains this state until t2, then S can satisfy this requirement without changing.
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Consider first a ‘non-positive’ (or ‘negative’) relation between a subject and a
process. Take the proposition that you do not form an intention to go skiing. Clearly,
this proposition denotes a relation between you and a process. Yet the truth of this
proposition does not imply that you undergo a process and consequently change.
It is possible that you simply remain as you are and satisfy this requirement.
In contrast, the proposition ‘You form an intention to go skiing’ denotes a positive
relation between a process and a subject. Its truth necessitates that you are
undergoing a process and changing. In this sense, it denotes a positive relation
between you and a process. In short, if the proposition ‘S Xs’ signifies a positive
relation between S and a process, then S Xs can be true only if S undergoes a process.
3. Two putative functions: evaluation and guidance
Preliminaries over, I now come to my main subject: the function of process-
requirements. Why should we suppose that any normative requirement source
must issue (at least some) process-requirements, and not just requirements on
states? What could be an essential function of process-requirements, justifying
their existence?
To begin with, consider a requirement of rationality. It is commonly accepted
that rationality requires one’s normative beliefs and intentions to cohere with each
other (cf., for example, Broome 2008; Kolodny 2005; and Raz 2005). Roughly
speaking, rationality requires a person to intend whatever she believes she ought
to do. Kolodny, among many others, endorses this idea. He formulates this
requirement of rationality as follows.
Necessarily, if you believe at t that you ought to X, but you do not intend at t to X, then
rationality requires you to form going forward from t, on the basis of the content your
[sic] belief, the intention to X. (Kolodny 2007, 373)
No doubt, the consequent of this conditional states a process-requirement. When-
ever you believe that you ought to X, and yet you fail to intend to X, rationality
requires of you that you form an intention to X, on the basis of your belief that you
ought to X. ‘You form an intention to X’ denotes unequivocally a positive relation
between you and a process. It thus represents a genuine process-requirement.
Kolodny (2007, 373) thinks that essentially this formula is correct. He explic-
itly prefers it to a similar state-requirement formulation:
Necessarily, if you believe at t you ought to X, then rationality requires of you that
you intend at t to X. (Kolodny 2007, 373)
This formulation does not express a process-requirement. Its consequent states
a requirement with the following content: you intend at t to X. This refers to a
relation between you and an attitudinal state of yours. To satisfy this requirement,
no change is required.
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Kolodny prefers the process-formulation to the state-formulation. But should
we prefer it too?
Kolodny attempts to justify his preference by arguing that process-
requirements meet two significant functions that state-requirements are unable to
meet.14 First, to correctly represent our ordinary explanations and judgements
about a normative property (i.e., the property of prudence, morality, rationality,
etc.), we need to assume that the corresponding normative requirement source
issues process-requirements. Second, if a normative requirement source is to be
behaviour- or response-guiding, it needs to issue process-requirements. Only
process-requirements can guide our actions.
I will reconstruct Kolodny’s first argument in two steps: first, he asserts that our
ordinary attributions of the property of rationality are not only sensitive to the
states a person is in, but also to the process a person undergoes:
[An] [. . .] important feature of our ordinary attributions of rationality and irrational-
ity is that they attach not only to states, but also to processes. We judge that a person
is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the state he is in at a given time, but also
in virtue of how he transitions from one state to another over time. (Kolodny 2005,
516–517)
In a second step, Kolodny explicates this point as follows:
In other words, one is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the attitudes that one
has at any given moment, but also in virtue of how one forms, retains, and revises
one’s attitudes over time. (Kolodny 2005, 517)
That is, our grade of rationality is not only explained by the states we are in, but
also by the processes we undergo. From this, Kolodny infers that rationality issues
process-requirements.
Call this ‘Kolodny’s evaluation argument’. In assessing this argument, I shall
make two concessions: (1) some of our ordinary attributions of rationality are
based on the processes one undergoes; and (2) this implies that one possesses
one’s degree of rationality in virtue of how one forms and revises one’s attitudes.15
But even so, does this show that rationality imposes process-requirements upon
us?
Consider a normative requirement source N that comes with a corresponding
normative property, say PN. Morality, rationality or prudence could possibly serve
14 Though Kolodny (2005; 2007) presents his arguments in the domain of rational
requirements, I will take the liberty in this paper to extrapolate his arguments to sources of
normative requirements other than rationality.
15 To be sure, this implication holds only if we assume that our ordinary, process-based
attributions of rationality and irrationality are, at least sometimes, correct.
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as such a source. These are requirement sources, yet they also constitute a corre-
sponding property: a certain degree of rationality, prudence or morality.16
Suppose, then, that a subject S possesses a non-maximal degree of PN. That
is, S is, for example, not fully rational, moral, or prudent. Assume further that S
has a non-maximal degree of PN in virtue of S failing to undergo a certain process,
say F. In the context of Kolodny’s evaluation argument, I read “in virtue of” as
expressing an explanatory and/or (at least) a counterfactual relationship between
S failing to undergo F and S’s non-maximal degree of PN. That is, if S were to
undergo F, then, ceteris paribus, (this would explain why) S had a different
(higher) degree of PN. This implies, Kolodny claims, that N imposes a process-
requirement. It requires of S that S undergo F.
On the face of it, Kolodny’s evaluation argument seems compelling. If you are,
say, irrational because you fail to change some of your attitudes, it seems plausible
that rationality requires you to change those attitudes so as to restore your ratio-
nality. Likewise, if you are immoral because you refrain from undergoing a certain
process, morality requires you to undergo that process. Consequently, some, if not
all, normative sources seem to impose process-requirements.
Though on the face of it this appears plausible, I doubt that it is a sound
argument. It presupposes the correctness of the following inference.
at t, S has a non-maximal degree of PN because S not-Xs. (1a)
and
If, at t, S has a non-maximal degree of PN because S not-Xs, (1b)
then N requires of S that S Xs.
Therefore
at t, N requires of S that S Xs. (1c)
This is not a sound argument: (1b) is incorrect. First, an explanation for why you
have a non-maximal degree of PN may lie in the past: suppose, at present, you are
immoral because, some time ago, you decided to adopt the rule not to help anyone
in need. Suppose, further, that the fact that you adopted this rule explains, at present,
why you are not fully moral. If you had not adopted this rule, you would not be
immoral now. Even so, it is surely absurd to infer from this that now morality
requires you to undo the fact that, some time ago, you adopted a rule in the past.
In the now, necessity extends to the facts of the past – at least on a practical level.
Such a requirement would thus violate the principle that ‘morality requires’ implies
‘practically can’. It is thus not a plausible requirement of rationality.
This perhaps also suggests a way to reform the inference. Maybe N requires
you instead to undo everything that constitutes an explanation of why you have a
16 Intuitively, we can attribute a degree of a property PN to a subject S that corres-
ponds to a normative requirement source N if and only if S is subject to a requirement issued by
source N.
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non-maximal degree of PN if you are practically able to do so. That is, suppose, at
present, you have a non-maximal degree of PN because you not-X. You are now
able to X. So, N requires you to X.
However, I doubt that this suggestion can fix the argument. Take a coherentist
version of rationality. Broadly speaking, rationality issues requirements that
require one to avoid certain conflicts among one’s attitudes.17 It requires you not
to believe contradictions, to intend the means necessary to your intended ends,
to intend to do what you believe you ought to do, etc. Suppose that currently you
happen to believe that you ought to undertake some physical exercise, but you have
no intention of doing so. You violate a requirement of rationality. Your failure to
intend to exercise has a clear explanation: your current laziness. This prevents you
from forming an intention to exercise.
Let us assume that you are practically able to undo your laziness. A bit of
strong-willed authority over your activities would guarantee just that. According to
the reformed argument, this would entail that coherentist rationality requires you
not to be lazy. Surely, this is absurd. Coherentist rationality requires you to be
coherent. Laziness does not per se constitute a form of incoherence among your
attitudes. It is thus not part of what rationality requires of one. Hence, the reformed
argument fails too.
In sum, we cannot infer the existence of process-requirements from the fact
that failing to undergo a process can explain why we lack some property that
corresponds to a source of requirements.
I now turn to Kolodny’s second argument. One function of normative require-
ments, Kolodny assumes, is to be normatively response guiding. Normative
requirements need to guide our actions and function as sources of advice in our
deliberations. Kolodny argues that only process-requirements can be response
guiding. He, in fact, doubts that non-process-requirements are real ‘requirements’
at all:
Being rational just is responding in the ways that process-requirements call
for. . . . [T]he very idea of a state-requirement is questionable. If rational require-
ments are normative, deontic, or response guiding, then they call for the subject to
respond in a certain way. It is clear how forming, retaining, or revising one’s attitudes
so as to avoid or escape a conflict state might qualify as a response. But how might
not being in a conflict-state qualify as a response? Indeed, one feels driven to
interpret the claim that one is required not to be in a conflict state as simply the claim
that one is under a very general process-requirement: to avoid or escape that conflict-
state in any way one likes. (Kolodny 2005, 517)
Call this ‘Kolodny’s guidance argument’. In brief, Kolodny argues that only
process-requirements can be response guiding. I think his argument is confused.
To show why, I need to first elucidate the notion of ‘guidance’. Look again at the
17 For a precise description of this type of rationality, see Scanlon 2007.
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GRS: at t, N requires of S that S Xs. What needs to be true of S, N, and S Xs, so that
it can be said that S is guided by a requirement of this form?
In principle, there are two ways in which a requirement can be guiding (cf.
Smith 1988). Here is the first: suppose S explicitly represents the requirement (‘at
t, N requires of S that S Xs’) as the content of a propositional attitude – for instance,
a belief that the requirement is correct, or an intention to satisfy it. S is then guided
by a requirement via mentally entraining the requirement in S’s reasoning. That is,
S’s representation of the requirement causes S, in the right way,18 to ensure that
S Xs. For example, deliberating between whether to buy a new car or to donate the
money to Oxfam, you come to form a belief that morality requires you to donate
the money rather than buy the car with it. If the entertainment of this belief then
causes you, in the right way, to donate the money to Oxfam,19 then you were
guided by the requirement. In fact, the attitude that represents the requirement
causes its satisfaction. I shall call this ‘explicit-causal guidance’.20
Here is a second way in which a normative requirement can be guiding. Often,
we are guided by a requirement without having any explicit representation of it
(cf. Railton 2006). In this sense, a requirement may be guiding in that one
sub-consciously ‘subscribes to’ the requirement. Being guided by a requirement
then consists in a suitable disposition21 to conform to or satisfy the requirement
when one is subject to it.
Imagine a case like the following: suppose, for example, prudence requires you
to buy a ticket when taking the Underground. The expected fine exceeds the money
18 I need to add “in the right way” in order to avoid the problem of deviant causation.
Suppose, for example, that you are a deeply immoral person. You despise everything moral,
though you accept that morality requires things of us. A consequence of your immorality is that
you are reliably disposed not to do anything moral. Assume now that this disposition, in
conjunction with your moral-requirement belief, cause you to sign what you take to be a petition
against donating to Oxfam. Yet you are mistaken about the document you signed. It is not a
petition against Oxfam, but a cheque that will transfer your money to Oxfam. Consequently, your
belief in a moral requirement has caused you to donate money to Oxfam. Yet, surely, you have
not been guided by any moral requirement.
I will not try to define “in the right way” here. For a creative and promising answer to this
question in the context of reasoning, see Wedgwood 2006.
19 For a poignant criticism of this transition to count as genuine reasoning, see Broome
2009, sect. 3, and 2006, sects. 3 and 5.
20 One problem that arises in the context of causal-explicit guidance is the problem of
following a rule. Suppose S explicitly represents the requirement R as the content of one of her
propositional attitudes. Suppose this causes, in a non-deviant way, that S satisfies R. Then, the
following question arises: how can we know that S was in fact guided by R, and not by some other
requirement whose content is co-extensive with that of R? (cf. Wittgenstein 1953 and Kripke
1982). I shall not try to answer this question here. Instead, I will assume that there is an adequate
way of picking out the exact content of a requirement that a subject follows.
21 I do not wish to define when exactly a disposition of this sort will count as suitable.
For a very informative discussion of the nature of such a suitable disposition, see Railton 2006,
13.
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you save by riding free. Because you have been caught once without a ticket, you
have developed a reliable disposition to buy a ticket before entering the Under-
ground. Your disposition is so reliable that you expect yourself to buy a ticket
before riding the Underground. Furthermore, noticing that you forgot to buy a
ticket gives you a feeling of uneasiness, making you get off the train as soon as you
can. In this case, it seems plausible that your behaviour is, in one sense or another,
guided by a prudential requirement not to ride the underground without a valid
ticket. This is the case even without your being aware of the requirement. I shall
call this ‘dispositional guidance’.
Suppose a requirement R is guiding in the explicitly-causal or in the disposi-
tional sense. Does this imply that R is a process-requirement? Does R’s content
have to refer to a relation between a subject and a process?
I do not think so. Let us start with dispositional guidance. For this type of
guidance to imply the existence of process-requirements, it would have to be
the case that all dispositions are tied to processes. That is, you can only have a
disposition of the relevant kind to G if G is a way of changing. In other words, it
is not possible to have a disposition to be or to remain as one is.
No doubt, this would be an absurd view. One can be disposed to be or to remain
in the state of not believing a contradiction, for instance. Of course, such a
disposition, if reliable, will imply that one is changing one’s attitudes whenever
one detects a contradiction among one’s beliefs. Further, one will adjust one’s
beliefs in such a way that one is prone not to enter the state of believing a
contradiction, etc. But that does not imply that one cannot be disposed to be some
way. At least, I do not know how to construe a credible argument for this position.
The same, I think, holds for causal-explicit guidance. Some prudential require-
ments will require you not to undergo a certain process. For example, I am sure
that prudence requires me at the moment not to jump out of the window. Clearly,
this is not a process-requirement. Suppose I form a belief about this requirement,
or that I intend to satisfy it. I do not see why entertaining this requirement in
such a way cannot cause me, in a non-deviant or rational way, to satisfy it. In
this sense, requirements that are not process-requirements can be guiding in the
explicit-causal way.
Why then does Kolodny claim that only process-requirements are guiding?
I guess his reasoning is this. Let us assume that you are undergoing a process that
is guided by a normative requirement R. Suppose R guides you to undergo a
process F. For instance, the fact that rationality requires you to intend the means
necessary to your intended ends guides you to form a particular intention. Call
R the ‘guiding requirement’ and F the ‘guided process’. Kolodny reasons, or so I
assume, that for F to be guided by R, it is necessary that the content of R explicitly
refer to a relation between the subject S and the process F. In other words, the
content of the guiding requirement must state the guided process. But that is a
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mistake. The content of R may refer to a relation between S and a state, and,
nevertheless, guide S to undergo F. For example, a requirement not to have
contradictory intentions may guide you to undergo a process of ridding yourself of
an intention that contradicts another intention of yours.
In sum, for F to be a guided process, it is not necessary that the content of
the guiding requirement R signify a relation between a subject and F. Kolodny’s
guidance argument thus fails to show that for a normative source to be guiding, it
needs to issue process-requirements.
4. Two further arguments
So far, I have argued that both of Kolodny’s arguments fail to establish the
existence of process-requirements. Neither the putatively guiding function of
normative requirements, nor the failure to undergo a process required by a nor-
mative source explaining why one lacks a maximal degree of a normative property
entails the existence of normative process-requirements.
In this section, I shall turn to two further arguments concerning the existence
of process-requirements. First, I will discuss the view that all requirements are
process-requirements. Second, I will consider whether process-requirements are
the consequence of a possible constitutive account of normative requirements.
In ‘Why be rational?’, Kolodny goes beyond defending that some rational
requirements process-requirements. He states that he is “[. . .] inclined to think
[. . .] that all rational requirements are process-requirements” (Kolodny 2005, 517;
my emphasis). Can this be a coherent view?
I do not think that it can. Consider a rational requirement that takes the
following form: rationality requires you to undergo a process so that you end up in
A, where A signifies a (combination of) state(s). What must be true of you so that
you can be subject to a requirement of this form? One condition seems evident: at
t, it must not be the case that you A. Take, for example, a requirement to form
an intention to A. This requirement can apply to you only whenever you do not
already have such an intention.
Intuitively, this is evident. There is no point in requiring you to form an attitude
you already have. Here is an argument in support of this intuition. First, consider
under which conditions you can, at t, form an intention to A. Obviously, you can,
at t, form an intention to A only if, at t, you do not intend to A. More generally, one
cannot undergo a process to end up with a particular attitude as long as one does
not have this attitude.22 Thus, if ‘at t, rationality requires you to X’ implies that ‘at
22 Compare this with the process of driving to LA. You cannot drive to LA if you are
already in LA. Or you cannot raise your arm if your arm is already raised. Likewise, you cannot
rid yourself of a belief that p if you do not believe that p.
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t, you can X’, then you can be subject to a requirement to form A only if you
not-A.
Let us assume now that, at t, you are fully rational. That is, at t, you only hold
attitudes that are coherent and consistent with each other. Could you, in this
situation, be subject to a rational process-requirement, i.e., a requirement you only
satisfy through changing? I do not think you could. If anything, rationality would
require you not to change your attitudes, but to remain as you are. As explained
above, this would not amount to a process-requirement.
Let us add now Kolodny’s cautious assumption that all rational requirements
are process-requirements. It would imply that a fully rational individual is not
subject to a single rational requirement.23 A fortiori, a fully rational individual
would not satisfy one requirement of rationality.
This is implausible. Compare this result with other normative sources of
requirements. Suppose you are perfectly moral. You do everything morality
demands of you. This does not imply that you evade all moral requirements.
Morality still requires you not to kill, to be kind to strangers, to keep your
23 Here is a way to doubt this: a fully rational individual could still be subject to
process-requirements, as long as they are future-oriented. Suppose again that at present you are
fully rational. This does not exclude you, one might argue, from being subject to the following
requirement: rationality requires of you at present that in one hour you either form an intention
to A or drop your belief that you ought to A. A necessary (and possibly sufficient) condition for
this requirement to apply to you is, of course, that it is now true that in one hour you believe that
you ought to A, yet you do not intend to A.
Arguably, this condition poses a first problem for the existence of future-orientated requirements.
I assume that either you satisfy or violate a requirement, or else you are not subject to it
(cf. Broome 2007a, 38). So, if you are subject to R, you either satisfy or violate it. Both the
satisfaction and violation of R, however, depend on the truth or falsity of a proposition describing
future events that have not yet occurred. Some philosophers deem such propositions neither to be
true nor false, as this, they argue, would imply an incredible version of determinism. For a clear
discussion of this problem, see Faye, Scheffler and Urchs (1997).
For the sake of the argument, I will ignore this potential problem. Consequently, if R applies to
you, then you either satisfy or violate R. But even so, I argue that it remains implausible that a
fully rational being is now subject to future-orientated process-requirements like R.
Recall that the issue at stake is whether you can be subject to R while being fully rational. For
this to be possible, the fact that it is presently true that in one hour you fail to intend to A, despite
your belief that you ought to A, cannot reduce your rationality now. For now, you are fully
rational. So, your future incoherence cannot contribute negatively to your degree of irrationality
now. But in contrast, the fact that at present it is true that in one hour either you drop your belief
that you ought to A or you form an intention to A must contribute positively to your degree of
rationality now. For it makes it the case that you now satisfy R – which is thus part of the
explanation why you are presently maximally rational. Put succinctly, if R were to represent a
correct requirement, then your future incoherence would not diminish your current rationality,
whereas your future transition towards coherence would contribute to your current rationality.
This is highly implausible. Hence, I doubt that one can be subject to future-orientated require-
ments like R while being fully rational. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising the
possibility of future-orientated process-requirements.
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promises, etc. As an impeccably moral person you satisfy all of these require-
ments. Hence, you are subject to these requirements.24
In brief, a fully moral, rational or prudent individual is not subject to moral,
rational or prudential process-requirements. Therefore, it cannot be that all moral,
rational or prudential requirements are process-requirements. Morality, rationality
and prudence do not only demand change.
I now turn to a further argument in favour of the existence of normative
process-requirements. What constitutes a normative requirement? In other words:
what makes it the case that a normative requirement source N requires of S that S Xs?
In the domain of rationality, Andrew Reisner, among others, alludes to what
I shall call the necessary-condition analysis. Reisner (2009, 257 n5) writes “that
rational requirements should express necessary [. . .] conditions for rationality”.
Kolodny supports this view. He states “it is relatively clear how we might settle
questions about what rationality requires; it requires whatever is necessary for
coherence” (Kolodny 2005, 511). I take it that Kolodny uses “coherence” as
expressing a property identical to full rationality.25 In short, rationality requires
whatever is (a) necessary (condition) for full rationality.
Extending this argument to normative sources of requirements other than
rationality, we can give the following account of normative requirements.
Necessary-condition account. Necessarily, for all normative sources N, N-
corresponding properties PN, subjects S, and propositions S Xs, N requires of S that
S Xs if and only if S Xs is a necessary condition for S to have a maximal degree of PN.
For example, if the fact that you eat lots of vegetables is a necessary condition for
you to have the property of full prudence, then prudence requires you to eat a lot
of vegetables. This account also stipulates when something is not required by a
normative source. For example, the fact that Sue’s counting the hairs in her
eyebrows is not a necessary condition for Sue to be fully moral entails that it is not
the case that morality requires of Sue that she count her eyebrow hairs.
Would the necessary-condition account of normative requirements guarantee
the existence of process-requirements? It certainly would. Suppose, at t, N requires
you to have a certain attitude A. Yet, at t, you lack this attitude. Hence, a necessary
condition for you to have a maximal degree of PN is to have A. Since you can have
24 The same argument could be offered for legal requirements. Suppose you are subject
to the laws that apply in a particular legislative context L. Suppose in L you possess a maximum
degree of legality. That is, you do everything the law requires of you. Again, this does not imply
that you evade the laws that apply to you in L. Instead, you satisfy all of them.
25 On might suspect that this makes Kolodny’s analysis circular, but it does not. As
explained in the introduction, ‘rationality’ in ‘rationality requires’ refers to a source of require-
ments. It refers to the fact that rationality issues requirements. ‘Rationality’ in ‘full rationality’
refers to a property. It is a property one possesses if and only if one satisfies all requirements one
is under. For more on this source/property distinction see Broome (2007; 2010).
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A only if you form A, forming A will also be a necessary condition for you to have
a maximal degree of PN. Thus, N will require you to form A. This is a process-
requirement. Its content signifies a positive relation between a subject, i.e., you,
and a process, i.e., the formation of A. Consequently, if the necessary-condition
account is correct, then we can infer the existence of process-requirements.
However, the necessary-condition account cannot amount to a sound defence
of process-requirements. For it is not correct. In fact, it is too inclusive. It implies
that rationality, morality or prudence necessarily require things of us that are
clearly not necessarily required by these normative sources.
Take a list of necessary conditions for S to be fully rational, moral or prudent.
This list will surely include properties like ‘being alive’, ‘having a mind’, ‘thinking
with propositions’, ‘being spatially extended’, etc. No doubt, nothing can have the
property of full rationality, morality or prudence without being alive, or having a
mind or being spatially extended. But it would be absurd to say that in virtue of not
having one of these properties, S violates a normative requirement. Take a stone, for
example. It neither violates a normative requirement nor fails to be entirely as it ought
to be in virtue of not being alive, or having no mind, etc. – though these are plainly
necessary conditions, in any context, for a stone to be fully rational, moral or prudent.
There is another shortcoming in any necessary-condition account. Everything
would be subject to the requirements of rationality were we to accept it: stones,
flowers, tumble-dryers, etc. We would need to specify necessary conditions for full
rationality for all these things. Again, this is a nonsensical consequence. Stones,
flowers and tumble-dryers are plainly not subject to any requirements of rational-
ity. We cannot, therefore, give an account of normative requirements in terms of
only specifying necessary conditions for full rationality. In consequence, the
necessary-condition approach fails to prove the existence of process-requirements.
5. The function of normative process-requirements
So far, none of the putative functions of process-requirements discussed above
have been able to prove the existence of process-requirements. Nonetheless, in this
final section, I shall defend process-requirements as being essential for any system
of normative requirements. Process-requirements do possess a unique function
that non-process-requirements are unable to execute.
My defence of process-requirements will focus on a particular type of process-
requirement. I will look at requirements to undergo a process with the effect of
ending up in a state of having a certain (combination) of attitude(s).26 Such
requirements are not uncommon. I will argue that there are situations in which, for
26 Alternatively, I will be concerned with requirements that require one to undergo a
process so that one ends up in a particular state.
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example, morality requires you to form an intention to help your neighbours;
prudence requires you to drop your desire to play with guns; rationality requires
you to rid yourself of believing a contradiction, etc.
I shall refer to this type of normative requirement as a teleological process-
requirement. The ‘teleology’ consists in undergoing a process that aims at ending
in particular attitudinal state. If, for instance, prudence requires you to drop your
desire to play with guns, then this requirement aims at transforming you into a
state in which you are free of such a desire. In brief, I shall argue that teleological
process-requirements have the following function: they are necessary for ascribing
an accurate degree of a normative property to a subject. Put more precisely,
any system of normative requirements that lacks such teleological process-
requirements is unable to differentiate between: (a) a subject who is not entirely as
she ought to be, but who does nothing to redeem her normative failure; and (b) a
subject who is equally not as she ought to be, yet who is on her way to redeeming
this normative failure. I hope this view will become clear by the end of this section.
Before I can make this argument, however, I need to examine the satisfaction
conditions of teleological process-requirements. When does one satisfy, and when
does one violate such a requirement? Moreover, when does one avoid being
subject to a process-requirement?
To answer this, consider first a general formulation of teleological
process-requirements:
General teleological process-requirement: At t, N requires of S that S undergo a
process F so that S As,
where the proposition ‘S As’ denotes an attitudinal state or a particular attitude the
process F terminates in. For instance, let ‘F’ refer to the process of S forming a
belief that elephants are pink. Then, ‘S As’ signifies the state of S believing that
elephants are pink. In other words, the process F and the attitudinal state S As are
related such that F aims at realising that S As.
The following requirement covers the structure of the general teleological
process-requirement. Suppose, at t, prudence requires of Olivia that Olivia under-
goes a process of forming an intention with the effect that Olivia intends to reduce
her working hours. In short, at t, prudence requires Olivia to form an intention to
reduce her working hours. Call this requirement RP. When does Olivia satisfy or
violate this requirement? In addition, when does Olivia avoid being subject to this
requirement?
It is clear when Olivia satisfies RP. She satisfies it whenever: (1) RP applies to
her;27 and (2) the proposition forming the content of the requirement is true (i.e.
27 By ‘RP applies to her’, I mean that Olivia is subject to a requirement with the content
of RP. In other words, the proposition that expresses RP is true.
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Olivia undergoes a process of forming an intention to reduce her working hours).
But when exactly are (1) and (2) the case?
I think that prima facie there are two plausible views on this. The first view I
shall call ‘completion-satisfaction’: assume that RP applies within the period
between t1 and t2. In other words, for all times t within the period t1 and t2, RP holds
true. Then Olivia satisfies RP at every moment t within t1 and t2 for which it is true
that Olivia has completed the process of forming an intention to reduce her
working hours. In short, satisfying a teleological process-requirement is a matter
of completing the required process by ending up in the state the required process
aims at.
Does completion-satisfaction provide a correct view of when one satisfies a
teleological process-requirement? I do not think it does. In fact, it violates an
important constraint on normative requirements, namely that one can satisfy a
normative requirement while it applies to one.28 I shall illustrate this below.
In section 4, I already mentioned one condition for Olivia’s being able to
undergo a process so that she will end up with an intention to reduce her working
hours: at t, Olivia can undergo this process only if, at t, she does not already intend
to reduce her working hours. That is, at t, one can form an intention to X only if,
at t, one does not intend to X. More generally, one cannot undergo a teleological
process aiming at forming a state as long as one is in that state.
Let us assume that a normative requirement implies can in the following sense:
if, at t, a normative source N requires of S that S Xs, then, at t, it is possible that S
Xs. I take this to be relatively uncontroversial.
Though uncontroversial, it has a significant consequence: Olivia can form an
intention to reduce her working hours only if she does not intend to reduce her
working hours. So, Olivia is subject to a normative requirement to form an
intention to reduce her working hours only if she does not intend reduce her
working hours. Intuitively, this seems evident too. There is no point in normatively
requiring one to form an intention one already has.
Apply this result to what I called completion-satisfaction, i.e., the view that
you satisfy a process-requirement from the moment you begin successfully com-
pleting the process onwards. It implies a significant application condition for
teleological process-requirements such as Rp: Olivia cannot intend to reduce her
working hours while she is subject to RP. Being subject to RP presupposes that
Olivia does not intend to reduce her working hours.
Apply this to the view that one satisfies a teleological process-requirement only
once one has formed the attitude at which the required process aims, i.e.,
completion-satisfaction. It implies that Olivia must violate RP for it to apply to her.
As long as Olivia is subject to RP, Olivia infringes this requirement by not having
28 Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007 defend this principle.
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reached the state of intending to reduce her working hours. The application of a
teleological process-requirement thus presupposes its violation.
This is significant. Completion-satisfaction implies that you cannot satisfy RP.
If it is not the case that you violate a teleological process-requirement, then you are
not subject to this requirement. Consequently, you cannot satisfy a teleological
process-requirement.
No doubt, this is an incredible result. It should lead us to abandon completion-
satisfaction and consider an alternative account of when a subject satisfies a
teleological process-requirement.
I now turn to another account as to when a subject satisfies a teleological
process-requirement. Consider again RP and assume that Olivia is under this
requirement between t1 and t2. Within this period, I suggest that Olivia satisfies RP
from the moment she enters a process of forming an intention to reduce her
working hours until the moment she has successfully formed an intention to
reduce her working hours. In other words, Olivia satisfies RP exactly as long
as she is in the process of (successfully) forming the intention to reduce her
working hours.
Why does Olivia not satisfy RP before she enters this process? The answer
is trivial: Olivia is simply not undergoing the required process. Why does she
not satisfy RP after she has formed this intention? Because then, as explained
before, Olivia is no longer subject to this requirement. Put generally, one satisfies
a teleological process-requirement precisely in the period one undergoes the
process of successfully forming the state the process aims at.
Let us call this ‘in-the-process satisfaction’. It gives us a view on which you
can satisfy a teleological process-requirement while it applies to you. It thereby
avoids the grave problems arising from completion-satisfaction requirements.
But what could be an intelligible function of in-the-process-satisfaction process-
requirements? Why should one suppose that a normative requirement source
issues teleological process-requirements that you satisfy precisely as long as you
are successfully undergoing change towards a required state?
In the remainder of this paper, I shall defend the following view: in-the-process
satisfaction process-requirements are necessary to assign fine-grained degrees of
any normative property to a subject. Non-process-requirements, such as state
requirements, are unable to execute this function.
Suppose, at t, a normative source N requires Jack and Jim to intend to help their
neighbours. However, both violate this requirement, as, at t, Jack and Jim have no
intention of helping their neighbours. Suppose further that, at t, Jack and Jim are
identical in every aspect save one: at t, Jack is deliberately undergoing a process of
(successfully) forming an intention to help their neighbours, whereas Jim is not. I
assume this implies – at least for some normative source N – that, at t, Jack has a
higher corresponding property degree of PN than Jim.
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Why is this assumption correct? Suppose morality requires both Jack and Jim
individually to intend to help their neighbours. Their neighbours’ house is about
to burn down and they can hear them screaming for help. Assume that while Jim
remains unmoved by this event, Jack has started deciding to do something about
the situation. This brings him to, at t, undergo a deliberate process to successfully
form the required intention. Even though, at t, both fail to be as they are ultimately
required to be, Jack seems at this point to be the more moral individual. He is
changing in a moral direction. For this, I assume, Jack deserves some normative
credit. We should ascribe a higher degree of morality to Jack than to Jim.
If this is correct, then it entails that teleological in-the-process-satisfaction
process-requirements have a significant function. Take again the normative
requirement source ‘morality’, and its corresponding property. How moral S will
be, at a given point of time, will depend on the ratio of moral requirements that
S satisfies/violates at t. I assume there will be a function from requirement
satisfaction/violation to the degree of the normative property.29 If this is the case,
it will guarantee the correctness of the following ‘minimal comparative principle’.
Minimal comparative principle. Necessarily, for all times t, subjects S, requirement
sources N, and degrees of normative properties PN, if, at t, S1 and S2 are subject to the
same requirements of N, then, at t, S1 has a higher degree of PN than S2 if and only
if, at t, S1 satisfies at least one more requirement of N than S2.
Put succinctly, two subjects that are under the same set of normative requirements
cannot have different degrees of a normative property unless one of them satisfies
a requirement that the other does not satisfy. With this principle in mind, let us
consider looking again at the example of Jack and Jim above. I said that, at t, Jack
is more moral than Jim because in one aspect of his attitudes, Jack is intentionally
moving in a moral direction. Unlike Jim, Jack is, at t, on his way in undergoing a
deliberate process that will redeem his violation of a moral state-requirement,
namely to intend to help his neighbours. Given the minimal comparative principle,
this can be so only if Jack satisfies at least one more moral requirement than Jim.
As Jack and Jim are otherwise morally identical, the satisfaction of this additional
requirement must be regarded as the only difference that holds between Jack and
Jim: the fact that, at t, Jack, unlike Jim, is undergoing the process of forming this
intention to help his neighbours. This is what satisfies the additional requirement
and makes Jack more moral than Jim.
Consequently, we need to suppose that both Jack and Jim are subject to at least
one teleological in-the-process satisfaction process-requirement. This requirement
29 I do not take this to be a linear function. Some requirements will be more significant
that others. Their satisfaction will lead to a higher increase of your degree of a normative property
than the satisfaction of less significant requirements. Nevertheless, I assume that the satisfaction
of an additional normative requirement will always – all other things being equal – lead to some
increase of the degree of your normative property.
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will read as follows: at t, morality requires of both Jack and Jim individually that
each deliberately form an intention to help his neighbours. Jack satisfies this
requirement because, at t, he is undergoing a deliberate process of forming an
intention to help his neighbours. Jim violates it because, at t, he is not forming
an intention to help his neighbours. This requirement, therefore, marks the nor-
mative difference between Jack and Jim. It gives us a means of conducting a fitting
normative appraisal of them.
In sum, the function of normative process-requirements is this: suppose, at t, a
normative requirement source N requires you to be in a particular attitudinal state
A. However, at t, you not-A. Assume now that you can increase your degree of N’s
corresponding property, PN, by, ceteris paribus, successfully undergoing a certain
type of process that will lead you to X at t1. Moving in the ‘right direction’ will thus
give you some normative credit. This can be so, however, only if by undergoing
this process you satisfy a normative requirement you did not satisfy before under-
going the process. Consequently, you must be subject to a requirement that you
satisfy only while successfully forming the attitudinal state A. Such a requirement
will need to have the following features. First, its content will have to define a
positive relation between you and a process of forming X. Second, you will have
to satisfy it in the period in which you are successfully forming X. These two
features in fact constitute a definition of teleological process-requirements. Their
outlined function therefore guarantees their existence.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the existence of normative process-requirements. Process-
requirements are often held to fulfil two essential functions: first, they are suppos-
edly necessary to ensure that a normative source of requirements can guide our
behaviour; second, process-requirements are thought necessary for the correctness
of our ordinary, process-based explanations of our degrees of a normative property.
I argue, however, that both these putative functions are unable to establish the
existence of process-requirements. First, to be guiding is not an exclusive function
of process-requirements; non-process-requirements can also guide our behaviour.
Second, the fact that degrees of normative properties depend counterfactually or
explanatorily on processes we (fail to) undergo is logically too weak to prove the
existence of process-requirements. If this were sufficient to prove the existence of
process-requirements, it would imply, for example, that normative requirements
require us to undo everything that counts as an explanation of why we do not have
a full degree of a normative property. This would lead to implausible requirements.
Neither function can thus establish the existence of process-requirements.
However, I am not denying the existence of process-requirements altogether. In
fact, I argue that process-requirements do have an(other) essential function within
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any system of normative requirements. Process-requirements are necessary to
assign the correct degree of a normative property to those subjects who violate a
set of normative state-requirements, yet who are undergoing a process to redeem
this failure. A system of non-process-requirements could not evaluate such sub-
jects correctly. It could not differentiate between those on the one hand who violate
a set of state-requirements, yet who are in the process of changing this and those
on the other who are infringing the same set of requirements, and yet remain
unmoved to redeem this infringement. Process-requirements are consequently a
significant part of a system of normative requirements. They are needed for a
correct normative evaluation.
This conclusion may have significant ramifications for the nature of normative
requirements. For example, Kolodny premises two views on the existence of
process-requirements: first, that some requirements of rationality take a narrow
scope; and second, that these rational requirements are thus not reason-giving.
As far as the analysis and conclusions of this paper are concerned, this could
still amount to a sound argumentative route. However, I doubt that process-
requirements necessitate the narrow-scope form of rational requirements, or
indeed of any other type. I also doubt, therefore, that the existence of process-
requirements jeopardizes the reason-giving nature of rational requirements. Yet
these issues have not been touched in this paper, and still remain subject to further
analyses.*
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